Comments on: proof of deletion https://www.syslog.cl.cam.ac.uk/2011/10/25/proof-of-deletion/ The Cambridge Systems Research Blog Thu, 01 Dec 2011 19:14:00 +0000 hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.2.2 By: Richard Whitehouse https://www.syslog.cl.cam.ac.uk/2011/10/25/proof-of-deletion/comment-page-1/#comment-114 Thu, 01 Dec 2011 19:14:00 +0000 http://www.syslog.cl.cam.ac.uk/?p=755#comment-114 In reply to Malcolm.

Indeed, simply securely deleting the key would seem to satisfy the underlying problem. 

]]> By: Malcolm https://www.syslog.cl.cam.ac.uk/2011/10/25/proof-of-deletion/comment-page-1/#comment-113 Wed, 26 Oct 2011 13:14:00 +0000 http://www.syslog.cl.cam.ac.uk/?p=755#comment-113 What are you trying to protect against?  If the end user has the only copy of the key (and the key is sufficiently long) surely it doesn’t matter if the data stays in the cloud indefinitely?  Only the cloud provider would care whether the data is actually deleted when the user asks, as they presumably want the space back.

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